
Author unknown

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VVA Chapters in Alabama | |||
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| Chapter | Address | City | State | Zip |
| VVA ALABAMA STATE COUNCIL | 3121 APPLE VALLEY LANE | OXFORD | AL | 36203 |
| VVA CHAPTER #502 / Website | PO BOX 2326 | ANNISTON | AL | 36202- |
| VVA CHAPTER #511 / Web Site | PO BOX 604 | ATHENS | AL | 35611 |
| VVA CHAPTER #190 / Website | HOLMAN UNIT 3700 | ATMORE | AL | 36503-0037 |
| VVA CHAPTER #864 / Website | PO BOX 1081 | FAIRHOPE | AL | 36533 |
| VVA CHAPTER #637 / Website | PO BOX 164 | GADSDEN | AL | 35902- |
| VVA CHAPTER #701/ Website | PO BOX 850775 | MOBILE | AL | 36685- |
| VVA CHAPTER #607 / Website | 220 2ND STREET | MONTGOMERY | AL | 36110- |
| VVA CHAPTER #373 / Website | PO BOX 1112 | DALEVILLE | AL | 36322 |
| VVA CHAPTER #416 / Website | P.O. BOX 1354 | LEEDS | AL | 35094 |
| VVA CHAPTER #740 / Website | 565 E RENFROE RD | TALLADEGA | AL | 35160- |
| VVA CHAPTER #301 / Website | 2621 7TH STREET | TUSCALOOSA | AL | 35401-1803 |
| VVA CHAPTER #786 / Website | PO BOX 1032 | WINFIELD | AL | 35594 |
| VVA CHAPTER #742 / Website | P.O. Box 195 | Sheffield | AL | 35660-0195 |
It was during LAM SON 719. "Music One Six" was the leader of an attackhelicopter section from "D" Company, 101st Aviation Battalion. He and hissection were assisting in the extraction of 1st ARVN Infantry Division's 4/1Battalion after six weeks of heavy combat in Laos.
The 4/1 Battalion had a strength of 420 when they had been inserted 40kilometers into Laos by helicopter combat assault. After six weeks ofcontinuous contact with North Vietnamese Regulars, the battalion had beenreduced in strength to 88, 61 of which were wounded. An English-speakingsergeant whose call sign was "Whiskey" was in command and had the onlyoperable radio. They were surrounded in a bomb crater at the base of a 1,500foot escarpment near the Xe Pon River. The enemy had loudspeakers and wascalling for the unit to surrender.

1968 Tet Offensive and the News Media
As with much of the Vietnam War, the news media misreported and misinterpreted the 1968 Tet Offensive. It was reported as an overwhelming success for the Communist forces, and a decided defeat for the U. S. forces. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Despite initial successes by the Communist forces, the Tet Offensive resulted in a major defeat of those forces. General Vo Nguyen Giap, the designer of the Tet Offensive, is considered by some as ranking with Wellington, Grant, Lee, MacArthur as a great commander. Still, militarily, the Tet Offensive was a total defeat of the Communist forces on all fronts. It resulted in the deaths of some 45,000 NVA troops and the complete, if not total destruction of the Viet Cong elements in South Vietnam. The organization of the Viet Cong units in the South never recovered. Years later, it was announced that Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap concurred that the Tet Offensive was a major defeat for his forces.
The Tet Offensive succeeded on only one front and that was the News front and the political arena. Particularly, prior to Tet, the majority of Americans were in favor of the war in Vietnam, but the misrepresentation of the truth gave momentum to the anti-war factions in the United States. Instead of the U. S. military being allowed to deliver the final knock-out blow to the Communist forces, politicians caved in to the anti-war activists. This was just one example in the Vietnam War of an inaccuracy becoming the perceived truth.

101st A/B - 173rd A/B Brigade - 82nd A/B
"Screamin' Eagles" - "The Herd" - "All American Div."
MYTH: The United States lost the war in Vietnam.
FACT: The U. S. military was not defeated in Vietnam.
The American military did not lose a battle of any consequence. From a military standpoint, it was almost an unprecedented performance. Quoting Douglas Pike, a professor at the University of California at Berkley, Gen. Westmoreland stated the war was a major military defeat for the VC and the NVA.
The fall of Saigon happened 30 April 1975, two years AFTER the American military left Vietnam. The last American troops departed in their entirety 29 March 1973.
How could we lose a war we had already stopped fighting? We fought to an agreed stalemate. The peace settlement was signed in Paris on 27 January 1973. It called for release of all U. S. prisoners, withdrawal of all U. S. forces inside South Vietnam, and a commitment to peaceful reunification. The 140,000 evacuees in April 1975 during the fall of Saigon consisted almost entirely of civilians and Vietnamese military, NOT American military running for their lives. There were almost twice as many casualties in Southeast Asia (primarily Cambodia) the first two years after the fall of Saigon in 1975 than there were during the more than ten years the U. S. was involved in Vietnam. Thanks for the perceived loss and the countless assassinations and torture visited upon Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians goes mainly to the American media and their undying support-by-misrepresentation of the anti-war movement in the United States.

Myth: Common belief is that most Vietnam veterans were drafted.
Fact: 2/3 of the men who served in Vietnam were volunteers. 2/3 of the men who served in World War II were drafted. Approximately 70% of those killed in Vietnam were volunteers.

U. S. Special Forces - MACV
9,087,000 military personnel served on active duty during the official Vietnam era from August 5, 1964 to May 7, 1975
Veterans represented 9.7% of their generation
240 men were awarded the Medal of Honor
58,148 were killed in Vietnam
304.000 were wounded
75,000 were severely wounded
23,214 were 100% disabled
5,283 lost limbs; 1,081 sustained multiple amputations
Of those killed, 61% were younger than 21
11,465 of those killed were younger than 20
Of those killed, 17,539 were married
Average age of men killed was 23.1 years
Five men killed in Vietnam were only 16 years old
The oldest man killed was 62 years old
97% of Vietnam veterans were honorably discharged
91% of Vietnam veterans say they are glad they served
74% say they would serve again, even knowing the outcome
There is no difference in drug usage between Vietnam veterans and non-Vietnam veterans of the same age group.
(Source: Veterans Administration study)
Vietnam veterans have a lower unemployment rate than the same non-vet groups.
Vietnam veterans’ personal income exceeds that of our non-veteran group by more than 18%.
Vietnam veterans are less likely to be in prison – only one-half of one percent of Vietnam veterans have been jailed for crimes.

Some ask how the Viet Cong could fight so well against the U. S. military forces who obviously were better equipped and better trained. Those who were there know first-hand that, although from American standards the Viet Cong seemed like an unlikely formidable military force, they were just that .
Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Paul F. Smith,
173rd Airborne Brigade
“In the context in which we consider morale as a factor affecting the performance of our soldiers, I do not believe morale to have been important in measuring performance of the VC soldier. I believe indoctrination and
discipline induced subjugation of all personal feelings. Discipline within the VC was outstanding until a situation arose that had not been covered in instructions or indoctrination – then it broke down. VC small-unit tactics lacked the element of fire and maneuver. This was probably so because the VC units were not designed for confrontational warfare nor were they structured or trained to engage organized, aggressive, well-controlled and supplied enemy forces. Their hit-and-run, ambush, infiltration, and harassing tactics were outstanding – particularly against the impatient American…”
Remarks by
Gen. (Ret.) W. B. Rosson
Chief of Staff, MACV
Commanding General, Task Force Oregon (later Americal Division)
Commanding General, I Field Force
Commanding General, Provisional Corps, Viet Nam (later XXIV Corps)
Acting Commander, III Marine Amphibious Force
Deputy Commander, USMACV
One came to admire, possible envy, the VC and NVA for their stealth, mastery of camouflage, ability to move and operate at night, noise and light discipline, and removal of bodies and weapons from the battlefield. They were impressive at times in breaching wire obstacles by stealth, demolition, or wave assault. Conduct of ambushes became a specialty.…the VC and NVA demonstrated convincingly their ability to withstand the physical and psychological hardships of campaigning ‘for the duration’ in an environment of uncommon severity and danger.”

Comments
After seeing this website, a friend of mine who served in the 173rd in Nam in 1967-68, sent me the following comments, which are his observations, and are presented for discussion:
Activated in 1915, as the 173rd Infantry Brigade the unit saw service in World War I, but is best known for its actions during the Vietnam War. The brigade was the first major United States Army ground formation deployed in Vietnam, serving there May 1965–1971 and losing almost 1,800 soldiers. Noted for its roles in Operation Hump and Operation Junction City, the 173rd is best known for the Battle of Dak To, where it suffered heavy casualties in close combat with North Vietnamese forces. Brigade members received over 7,700 decorations, including more than 6,000 Purple Hearts. The brigade returned to the United States, where it was inactivated in 1972.

The above memorial, patterened after the Vietnam Wall in Washington, D. C.,
was erected by the VFW Post in Athens, Alabama, and is located in the
southbound rest area of I-65 in north Alabama (where the big missile sits).
This beautiful memorial lists the names of all Alabamians who made the
ultimate sacrifice in the Vietnam War.
A Military Prayer
I saw a soldier kneeling down,
for this was the first quiet place he had found.
He had traveled through jungles, rivers, and mud.
His hands were scarred and toil-worn.
He had fought for days from night 'til morn.
He folded his hands and looked to the sky.
I saw his tears, as they welled in his eyes.
Those Who Didn’T Return
If you are able, save for them
a place inside of you
and save one backward glance when you are leavingfor the places
they can no longer go.
Be not ashamed
to say you love them,
though you may or
may not have always.
Take what they have left
and what they have taught you
and keep it with your own
and take one moment to embrace
those gentle heroes
you left behind.
For they are the true heroes
of their generation.

CONECUH RIVER DEPOT MILITARY MUSEUM